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This paper studies the detrimental effect of sudden stops on the growth of Thai firms’ fixed
assets. We focus on the fixed assets adjustment that firms undertake at times of financial
constraints. We derive our results from balance sheet data for 284 nonfinancial Thai listed
firms. Our data demonstrate that Thai firms faced severe declines in the growth of their fixed
assets starting in 1996. Regression results demonstrate, after controlling for firms’ characteristics
and lagged dependent variables, that a longer-term debt maturity structure is the factor that
works in the firms’ favor during sudden stop episodes, while it is their profitability that matters
during tranquil periods.
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I. Introduction
“Sudden Stops” or reversals of capital inflows and the subsequent withdrawal of
international capital are considered to be the spark that set off several of the recent
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crises in countries such as Thailand and South Korea. The IMF asserts in the
World Economic Outlook (1998) that the ensuing declines in asset prices and
exchange rates caused by sudden stops during the late 1990s went well beyond
what was justified by any reasonable assessment of economic fundamentals. Of
all crisis countries, Thailand faced one of the largest capital inflow reversals seen
to date, and Figure 1 demonstrates this graphically. Furthermore, Calvo and Reinhart
(2000) estimated that the country had cumulative inflows as a percent of GDP of
approximately 51.5% between the period 1988 and 1994 and that it suffered from
reversals of 26% between 1996 and 1997.
Figure 1. Behavior of Thai capital flows
Sudden stops in capital inflows such as that seen in Thailand need to be offset
by either reserve losses or lower current account deficits, and in general lead to
contractions in output because of large and unexpected swings in relative prices.
Reserve losses tend to increase a country’s financial vulnerability, whereas
contractions in the current account tend to have serious effects on production
and employment. Moreover, the interest rate increases following a sudden stop
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incidence of nonperforming loans (NPLs) because the cost of servicing the debt
rises and debt burdens surge if debt is denominated in foreign currency. Firms in
this situation tend to face a decline in net worth. The effects on the exchange rate
of the sudden stop, accompanied by a likely currency mismatch between liabilities
and income at the firm level, cause creditors to require higher rates of return or limit
the amount of new debt issued to these firms (Bleakley and Cowan 2004). In this
situation banks become more cautious and cut lending, especially to small- and
medium-size firms, giving rise to what the literature has labeled a “credit crunch”
(Ito and Pereira da Silva 1999).1
As Thailand faced one of the most abrupt sudden stops of capital inflows,
highly leveraged firms as compared with those in other regions of the world found
themselves credit constrained and with increasingly damaged balance sheets.2
Consequently, they found themselves forced to cut investment and/or undertake
distress sales of physical capital to fulfill their debt obligations. Thailand was
particularly characterized by a large number of firms having to engage in distress
sales of physical capital or fire sales as they became popularly known. Figure 2
depicts the decline that begins in 1996 and does not reverse until mid 1999. By mid
1999 that trend gradually reverses, revealing signs of growth at a relatively slower
rate.3
In spite of this dramatic event, very little is known about the precise determinants
of investment at the microeconomic level during this sudden stop period. Our
paper aims at shedding some light in this direction by characterizing the factors
that exacerbated financial constraints—proxied by adjustment of fixed assets—
experienced by Thai firms due to sudden stop episodes. Our goal is to analyze, in
particular, various balance sheet and firm-level characteristics that induced firms
to meet debt obligations through the adjustment of fixed assets.
1 Ito and Pereira da Silva (1999), using a survey of 15 Thai banks, demonstrate empirically the
existence of a credit crunch in Thailand during the period between 1997 and 1998 characterized
by the factors described above.
2 According to Pomerleano (1998), the debt–equity ratios seen in Asian firms, particularly
Thai and Korean, were substantially larger than those seen in Latin American, German and US
companies. Debt–equity ratios of US firms averaged 90% by the end of 1996, Latin American
firms averaged 31%, while Thai firms averaged 155%.
3 Given that substantial declines in the growth of firms’ fixed assets occurred around the time
of the capital inflow reversals and abrupt devaluation, we argue that a large portion of sales
must have been the result of increasing levels of uncertainty and financial constraints, which
forced firms to sell their assets at a discount by engaging in fire sales. JOURNAL OF APPLIED ECONOMICS 312
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There are particular firm characteristics that in general contribute towards
determining how constrained a firm might be, and consequently, how likely it
would be to engage in distressed sales of physical capital. Some of those
characteristics include the level of internal resources that would allow a firm to
finance its production internally, the size of the firm, the issuance of American
Depository Receipts (ADRs), the type of commodity a firm produces (tradable/
nontradable), the degree of foreign ownership, the fact that a firm might be a
multinational company or not, the degree of macroeconomic instability, and the
industry to which the firm belongs. The degree of deterioration of a firm’s balance
sheet in terms of profitability and debt maturity structure is also considered. We
pay particular attention to the short-term debt exposure to gauge the level of
obligations that the firm must fulfill in a short time frame, while we also consider
fluctuations in domestic demand because they affect revenues from sales and
consequently influence financing needs.
Data analysis reveals that Thai nonfinancial firms suffered from a significant
decline in their fixed assets throughout the capital outflow period.4 Furthermore,
descriptive statistics and graphic analysis demonstrate that sector-macro and firm-
specific variables behaved significantly differently during sudden stop and non-
sudden stop episodes. At the firm level, the tradable sectors were taking significant
amounts of short-term debt—about 80% of total debt prior to the crisis period,
which significantly worsened their balance sheets once capital inflow reversals
took place.313 ROLE OF DEBT MATURITY ON FIRMS’ FIXED ASSETS
This study relates to a growing literature on currency crises that stresses
shocks to firm balance sheets, and, more broadly, on the effect of balance sheet
health on investment, where much work has been done on the role of financing
constraints in investment decisions. Examples include Fazzari et al. (1988) and
Hoshi et al. (1991) among others. It is a classic but still an unsettled question
(Gomes 2001). In the context of the Asian crisis, Kim and Stone (1999) is one of the
few studies that examine this subject theoretically. As for empirical investigation,
there are a handful of studies—some focusing on mergers and acquisitions activities
(Aguiar and Gopinath 2002, and Mody and Megishi 2001), others such as Aguiar
(2004), and Bleakley and Cowan (2004), similar to ours, working on the adjustment
of physical capital.
This paper provides new evidence on balance sheet effects on Thai firms’
investment adjustments, an addition to existing work such as Aguiar (2004), and
Bleakley and Cowan (2004). Our findings reinforce and extend the results for Mexico
given in Aguiar (2004), who finds a significant effect of weak balance sheets—as
captured by heavy exposure to short-term foreign currency debt—on investment.
Our analysis of fixed asset adjustment by Thai firms similarly suggests that the
substantial shares of short-term debt were translated into subsequent slow growth
of investment during the sudden stop episode.
More importantly, this paper contributes by adding extra findings on tranquil
periods and on nontradable sectors. Comparison across the sudden stop and
tranquil periods reveals that debt maturity structure matters only during the sudden
stop period, and it is profitability that explains most during the tranquil period. The
rest of the paper is organized as follows. Section II describes the data and provides
summary statistics. Section III discusses the empirical evidence. Finally, Section
IV concludes. The Appendix provides detailed definitions of variables used and
their sources.
II. Data description and analysis
Our primary data source for the empirical analysis is Datastream, which contains
historical data for a variety of securities markets worldwide, covering equity, index,
commodity, currency, bond and economic data. For our sample, we use annual
corporate balance sheet and income statement data for 284 nonfinancial Thai firms
4 As in other papers in the field, we concentrate on the nonfinancial sector of the economy,
because it is in these sectors that investment decisions are undertaken. JOURNAL OF APPLIED ECONOMICS 314
publicly listed on the local stock market between the years 1992 and 2001.5 Table
1 provides a detailed description of the composition of the sectors that we have
identified and divided between tradable good producers and nontradable good
producers. Services and real estate are categorized as nontradable sectors while
primary commodities, manufactures, household products and food are classified
as tradable sectors.6
The service sector is the largest, represented by 68 firms, while the real estate
sector is the smallest, consisting of 28 firms7. Furthermore, it is interesting to note
that the primary product sector has the highest level of sales on average while the
real estate sector has the lowest (see Table 2). The real estate and primary product
sectors tend to be largest in terms of asset size, while the food and household
product sectors are the smallest.8 When it comes to after-tax profits, the food
sector has the highest profitability levels.
In terms of tradable and nontradable sectors, Table 2 reveals that the tradable
sector is characterized by having higher profits than the nontradable sector and
by being more exposed to short-term debt. The nontradable firms, in turn, tend to
be of relatively larger size.
Table 3 reveals that the Sudden Stop episode (defined as years 1997 and 1998)
led to a significant decline—of close to 50%—in the average growth of firms’ fixed
assets. Table 3 also reveals that macro and firm-specific variables behaved
significantly differently during sudden stop and non-sudden stop episodes. GNP
growth in Thailand averaged 5.6% during the non-sudden stop episode but
declined to an average growth rate of –4.2% during the sudden stop period. Average
consumption growth averaged 6.2% during the 1990s, except during the sudden
5 Because of data limitations, sample firms are limited to those that remained in business
(bankrupt/de-listed firms are not included) during the period of analysis, so it could be argued
that we are capturing the behavior of “high quality/best performing” firms in Thailand.
Furthermore, the actual number of firms varies per year as new firms are listed in the Thai stock
market and incorporated in the database. The actual number of firms per year in the dataset is:
1992=150, 1993=183, 1994=225, 1995=249, 1996=275, 1997=278, 1998=275, 1999=273,
2000=266, and 2001=250.
6 The food sector is one of the major exporting sectors in Thailand, e.g., frozen seafood,
noodles, rice, etc.
7 “Software and computer services” is categorized as nontradable service, as one firm,
“DATAMAT, Thailand”, that falls into this category mainly engages in retail sales of the
software products of other companies, such as Infosys from USA.
8 We use market capitalization as a proxy for size.315 ROLE OF DEBT MATURITY ON FIRMS’ FIXED ASSETS
Table 1. Summary statistics of listed firms, by industry
Description No. firms % total No. Tradable
observations
Generators and distributors of electricity 1 7 No
Provision of water and removal of sewage. 1 3 No
Gas distribution 1 8 No
Software & computer services 1 10 No
Telecom services 7 57 No
Hospital management & long term care 11 92 No
Support services 1 10 No
Food & drug retailers 1 9 No
Retailers, general 8 69 No
Leisure, entertainment & hotels 14 123 No
Media & photography 13 97 No
Transport: Airlines & airports, rail, road
& freight, shipping & ports 9 73 No
Service sector 68 23.9 558
House building 3 30 No
Other construction 1 8 No
Real estate 24 187 No
Real estate sector 28 9.9 225
Mining 4 33 Yes
Oil – integrated 1 8 Yes
Oil & gas - exploration & production 1 9 Yes
Services, including drilling, for oil and
natural gas exploration and production 1 10 Yes
Building & construction materials 20 169 Yes
Steel & other metals 5 40 Yes
Producers, converters and merchants of paper13 111 Yes
Primary sector 45 15.8 380
Chemicals 19 154 Yes
Information technology hardware 6 49 Yes
Engineering & machinery 5 38 Yes
Automobiles & parts 9 79 Yes JOURNAL OF APPLIED ECONOMICS 316
Diversified industrials 4 38 Yes
Electronic & electrical equipment 13 106 Yes
Manufacturing sector 56 19.7 464
Household goods & textiles 42 394 Yes
Personal care & household products 5 44 Yes
Household sector 47 16.5 438
Soft drinks 2 20 Yes
Food producers & processors 38 338 Yes
Food sector 40 14.1 358
Total 284 100.0 2423
Table 1. (Continued) Summary statistics of listed firms, by industry
Description No. firms % total No. Tradable
observations
Table 2. Listed firms’ characteristics, by sector
Food 4,101,828 2,851,679 154,925 0.05 0.80 55 0.07
Household 2,536,282 3,084,162 120,493 0.04 0.77 48 0.06
Manufacturing 3,882,950 8,079,078   32,380 0.02 0.73 58 0.12
Primary 5,705,389 11,655,857 152,857 0.00 0.64 55 0.10
Real estate 2,368,471 11,102,006 - 292,876 -0.05 0.56 52 0.08
Service 3,926,990 10,380,353 153,309 0.02 0.57 46 0.16
Non-tradable 3,866,412 10,591,635  23,604 0.00 0.57 48 0.13
Tradable 3,978,272 6,432,733  110,760 0.03 0.73 54 0.09
t-test Ho: mean
(tradable) - mean
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Table 3. Tranquil vs. sudden stop episodes (1997 and 1998)
         Tranquil       Sudden stop       t-test (p-value)
Growth of fixed assets 0.07 0.03 0.064
Sector inflation 0.03 0.06 0
Sector output growth 0.06 -0.04 0
Sector export growth 0.03 0.06 0.035
Sector consumption growth 0.06 -0.09 0
Sector capital formation growth 0.03 -0.37 0
Profitability growth -0.06 0.21 0
Interest coverage ratio 21.9 7.34 0.3006
Maturity 0.68 0.69 0.3574
Note: Ho: mean (tranquil) - mean (sudden stop) = 0
stop episode when it declined to an average negative growth rate of –9%.
Alternatively, the average growth rate of exports and sectoral inflation increased
during the sudden stop period as a consequence of the devaluation of the Thai
baht. Export growth across tradable industries increased from an average of 3.3%
during tranquil periods to 5.7% after the devaluation. Sectoral inflation rates also
increased from an average of 2.8% during tranquil times to 5.9% after the
devaluation.
At the firm level, the average interest coverage ratio, which describes the
ability of the firm to fulfill debt obligations with its earnings, declined from an
average ratio of 21.9 during good times to 7.3 during the sudden stop period (see
data Appendix for the definition).9 An important sign of increasing levels of firm
financial distress was either decreasing earnings or increasing interest payments
as debt rose, or a combination of both.
Furthermore, graphical analysis in Figure 3 shows that there are particular firm
characteristics that behave differently during sudden stop episodes and
consequently increase/decrease the chances that a firm might be forced to engage
in the sale of its fixed assets. The literature also demonstrates that these
characteristics tend to be highly correlated with the likelihood that a firm will face
financial constraints.
9 The differences in the interest coverage ratio between tranquil and sudden stop episodes are
not statistically significant at conventional levels. JOURNAL OF APPLIED ECONOMICS 318
For example, we see that those firms that had a relatively shorter debt-maturity
structure suffered from a steeper decline in their fixed assets as a consequence of
the sudden stop episode (Figure 3.A). This is intuitive and goes hand in hand with
the literature describing the characteristics of a liquidity crunch, which demonstrates
that firms with short-term liabilities tend to face higher degrees of financing
constraints and consequently more pressing needs to find either renewed financing
or liquidity to fulfill debt obligations. Moreover, financing is scarce and extremely
costly in situations of capital inflow reversals, thus leaving firms with two
alternatives, defaulting and/or entering into bankruptcy proceedings or selling
assets, probably at a discount, to cover the cost of the maturing debt.
Alternatively, the adjustment of fixed assets by multinational firms seemed less
significant than their domestic counterparts. The multinational firms, however, did
not show a clear recovery in investment during subsequent years, at least during
our sample period (Figure 3.E). A likely explanation is that these firms may not feel
as financially constrained after a drastic sudden stop episode, but may withhold
new investment until macroeconomic uncertainty recedes and stability is regained.
However, generally speaking, multinationals can cover their financing needs by
channeling funds from their subsidiaries located in countries not affected by the
downturn. Moreover, multinationals tend to be larger and better known than
domestic firms and as a consequence enjoy greater financing alternatives at the
domestic and international level. Work by Samphantharak (2003) demonstrates
that belonging to a business group in Thailand, which would imply a higher
likelihood of resorting to intra-firm financing, has a similar effect.
In addition, Figure 3.C reveals that small firms suffer from a steeper decline in
the growth of their fixed assets than larger ones. Current work demonstrates that
small and medium enterprises in Thailand have had relatively less access to formal
financing, as lending was skewed towards large firms, and the cost of financing
limited their growth potential. Furthermore, Figure 3.F demonstrates that having
access to external financing through the issuance of ADRs allows firms to have a
higher growth rate of fixed assets during tranquil times and a faster recovery
during downturns.10
There also seems to be a difference between tradable and nontradable sectors
when it comes to fluctuations in the growth of firms’ fixed assets during the sudden
10 ADRs, which stand for American Depositary Receipts, are certificates evidencing ownership
in one or several American Depositary Shares (ADSs). ADSs are a US dollar denominated form
of equity ownership in a non-US company—a Thai company in our case (www.adr.com).319 ROLE OF DEBT MATURITY ON FIRMS’ FIXED ASSETS
stop episode. Figure 3.D reveals that nontradable firms suffered from a more
pronounced and longer decline in the growth of their fixed assets after 1997 relative
to that felt by nontradable firms. A plausible explanation is that while nontradable
firms are severely affected by declines in demand due to economic fragility and
uncertainty, tradable firms partially compensate for this situation by being able to
sell their products abroad. The possibility of selling products abroad allows them
to gain foreign exchange, which is particularly desirable during devaluation
episodes, thus preventing them from having to engage in the sale of fixed assets to
curb liquidity constraints.
This data analysis revealed interesting trends and characteristics of firm
behavior during sudden stop vs. non-sudden stop episodes, clearly revealing that
across sectors, firms tended to be significantly hurt by the sudden stop episode in
terms of profitability, ability to repay debt, and debt structure. Furthermore, what
seems evident is that the tradable and nontradable sectors behave significantly
different. In the next section, we explore in greater detail the investment adjustment
of Thai firms as a response to increasing financial constraints during times of
financial distress.
III. Empirical estimations and results
In this section, we gauge the importance that shocks to firms’ balance sheet play
on the adjustment of fixed assets using a random effects model.11 We estimate a
reduced form investment equation (1) where lagged investment, profitability, and
financing costs (or shocks to balance sheet) account for fixed asset growth (see
Blanchard et al. 1993):
Iijt /Kijt-1=b1(C +X) + zijt ,            (1)
where Iijt /Kijt-1 stands for the adjustment of fixed assets of firm i in sector j at time
t, zijt is the error term and C represents the constant. X represents a vector of firm-
specific variables, which vary by firm or sector and over time; the variables include
balance sheet health, domestic demand as captured by sectoral consumption, as
11 The random effects estimator fits cross-sectional time-series regression models using a GLS
estimator. Breusch-Pagan and Lagrange multiplier tests attest to the appropriate selection of
the random effects estimator. JOURNAL OF APPLIED ECONOMICS 320
well as lagged dependent and other firms’ characteristics variables.12 For the balance
sheet variables capturing shocks to net worth, values in profitability and debt maturity
structure are used with one lag as they could be affected by current investment
opportunity variables.13 As for profitability, unlike Aguiar (2004), which looked at
“exports”, we use “profit” instead as our sample includes non-tradable sector firms.
Figure 3. Growth rate of fixed assets by firms’ characteristics
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12 We tested for a potential two-way direction of causality between firm-specific variables and
the dependent variable (percentage changes in fixed assets) in order to determine if right-hand-
side variables need to be lagged in order to avoid potential endogeneity. We test if the lagged
dependent variables are jointly zero in explaining the firm-specific variables. The tests strongly
rejected the hypothesis of causality for all firm-specific variables in the system.
13 To control for investment opportunities, a proxy such as total market value to its book
value—a rough proxy for Tobin’s Q—could be introduced. However, the variable may not be
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very relevant in our case as the asset markets in Thailand are not very liquid. Further, the
sample includes the period of excessive speculation, thus the market valuation may have
deviated from fundamentals. Nonetheless, we consider the variable in an alternative specification
as part of the robustness analysis to test if it is binding in Thai firms’ decision on investment.
14 For the degree of Thai ownership, we tried using a continuous variable reflecting the actual
percentage of ownership. For the size of the firm in addition to market capitalization, we tried
a proxy asset size. None of them change our main results.
15 Exact variable descriptions and sector descriptive statistics are in the Appendix.
16 For the sudden stop dummy variable we tried identifying those periods of negative capital
inflows (after 1997quarter 1) vs. just 1997 and 1998, as the current sudden stop dummy depicts.
Both yield similar results.
Firms’ characteristics that we consider include firm size (as measured by market
capitalization), degree of Thai ownership (dummy variable),14 whether firms are
tradable goods producers or not (dummy variable), whether firms are multinational
or not (dummy variable), and whether an ADR issuer or not (dummy variable).
The analysis distinguishes between periods of sudden stops of capital inflows,
tradable and nontradable sectors, and short- and long-term maturity holders.15
The benchmark model to be estimated is of the following form:
Iijt /Kijt-1 =b1(C +X) + g1 SS (C +X) + z ijt .                                                                 (2)
SS is a dummy variable that identifies the Sudden Stop episode (1997 and
1998),16 and is interacted with a constant and the vector X to determine whether
the variables behaved differently during the sudden stop episode. The b1 coefficient
captures the average effect of variables considered on a firm’s fixed assets growth,
while the (b1 + g1) coefficient captures the effect during the sudden stop episode.
A. Main results — tranquil vs. sudden stop episodes
Results in Table 4, columns (1)-(3), reveal that shocks to net worth —profitability
and maturity structure, variables of our interest— exhibit interesting regularities in
affecting fixed assets adjustment. The two variables, however, appear important in
different periods —profitability in a tranquil period but maturity structure in a
sudden stop period.
As Table 4, column (3), reveals, aside from the lagged dependent variables
and sectoral consumption, during tranquil periods, fluctuations in a firm’s
fixed assets depend primarily on its profitability and size. Two other variables
that matter —though to a lesser extent— are whether it is multinational, and whether JOURNAL OF APPLIED ECONOMICS 322
it is an ADR issuer. Alternatively, during sudden stop episodes, firms’
characteristics such as holding long-term maturity debt and being a tradable goods
producer become the factors that reduce the chances of having to postpone new
fixed asset investment, or sell fixed assets to reduce financing constraints.
As one would expect, Thai firms will be less likely to feel financially constrained
if the firms experienced high profitability—defined as after-tax profit divided by
total assets—in the previous period. Our results in Table 4, column (3), reveal that
during tranquil periods a unit increase in profitability leads to a 0.4% increase in
fixed assets growth in the following period. Firms’ fixed asset growth is also
accentuated when firms are of larger size. This is reinforced by the regression
results, which reveal that when a firm becomes on average larger than the median,
its fixed assets tend to grow by about 0.1%. This effect is significant even during
sudden stop episodes and is of practically similar magnitude, which clearly
demonstrates that being better known provides apparently more financing
alternatives. Additionally, being multinational is found to have negative effect in
firms’ fixed assets growth during tranquil times. This result is counterintuitive as
being multinational represents additional financing alternatives, one would expect
positive effects. A possible explanation of the negative effect might be the fact that
multinational firms’ fixed assets did not recover following the Sudden Stop episode.
Alternatively, having a longer-term debt maturity structure seems to play an
important role at times of crisis and when there are severe liquidity constraints, i.e.,
when interacting with the dummy variable that represents sudden stop episodes.
This is certainly intuitive during times of liquidity constraints, as was the case in
Thailand during the crisis. Having more time to repay debts saves firms from
having to postpone desired investment or resort to sales of assets to fulfill maturing
debt obligations or to find expensive financing, if at all available, to roll over
maturing debt. A shorter-term debt maturity structure led Thai firms during the
sudden stop episode to a 0.2% decrease in their annual fixed asset growth.
Further, Table 4, column (4), presents an estimation result for tradable goods
producers by including lagged growth of sectoral exports. The possibility of selling
products abroad could allow tradable sector firms to gain foreign exchange, which
is particularly desirable during devaluation episodes thus preventing them from
having to engage in forced fixed assets to curb liquidity constraints. Contrary to
Aguiar (2004), however, our results reveal that the sectoral export growth does not
matter for the growth of fixed assets both during tranquil and sudden stop periods.17
17 Note that Aguiar (2004) considers firm-level exports/sales while our data is at the sectoral
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B. Tradable vs. nontradable producers
Descriptive statistics revealed significantly different behavior between tradable
and nontradable good producers, also apparent in the previous regression results,
which are worth exploring further. The different behavior could arise because
tradable firms partially compensate for the declines in demand, during a sudden
stop/crisis episode, by being able to sell their products abroad. Nontradable firms,
alternatively, could find themselves more constrained due to the slowdown in
domestic sales, economic fragility and uncertainty.
The benchmark model is slightly modified to incorporate differences between
tradable vs. nontradable firms during tranquil and sudden stop times:
Iijt /Kijt-1 = b1(C+X) +g1 SS (C+X) +h1 Nontradable(C+X)                                    (3)
                 + l1 Nontradable SS (C+X) +z ijt
As before, C is the constant. In this case, the b1 coefficient captures the average
response of sector- and firm-specific characteristics on tradable firms’ fixed assets
during good times, while (b1+g1) captures their average response during the sudden
stop episode. Alternatively, (b1+h1) captures the average response of sector- and
firm-specific characteristics on nontradable firms’ fixed assets during good times,
while (b1+g1+h1+l1) captures the average response of sector- and firm-specific
characteristics on nontradable firms’ fixed assets during the sudden stop episode
(see Table 5).
Results reinforce the outcome of the previous specification in that profitability
matters only during a tranquil period while exposure to short-term maturity debt
becomes a significant factor in a Sudden Stop period—both after controlling for
persistency with lagged dependent variables. These relationships appear quite
robust. Additionally, an intuitive finding from this estimation is such that for both
profitability and maturity structure, the impacts are much larger for nontradable
sector firms. This result supports our prior suggestion of nontradable firms being
more sensitive to balance sheet fluctuations.
Further, in the case of nontradable goods producers, increases in domestic
consumption are important. Annual percentage increases in consumption lead to
increases in the growth of firm fixed assets of 1.8% (2.0%) during tranquil (sudden
stop) periods. Such impacts are more significant and almost four times larger than
those for tradable firms. The strong influence of the domestic variable on































4 Table 4. Regression results – Entire sample
(1)                                          (2)                                (3)                                  (4)
Coefficient p-value Coefficient p-value Coefficient p-value Coefficient p-value
b1
Lagged fixed assets -0.05 0.00 -0.04 0.00 -0.10 0.00 -0.11 0.00
Lagged growth of fixed assets -0.03 0.36 -0.04 0.16 -0.04 0.16 0.00 0.98
Lagged profitability 0.71 0.00 0.69 0.00 0.40 0.00 0.26 0.03
Lagged maturity structure -0.07 0.10 -0.06 0.22 -0.03 0.58 -0.01 0.90
Lagged growth of sectoral consumption 0.50 0.00 0.39 0.00 0.26 0.05
Lagged growth of sectoral exports -0.05 0.52
Tradable sector dummy 0.03 0.33
Size (market value) 0.09 0.00 0.08 0.00
Ownership dummy 0.01 0.79 0.02 0.47
Multinational dummy -0.11 0.05 0.01 0.85
ADR dummy 0.13 0.09 0.01 0.95
Constant C 0.78 0.00 0.60 0.00 0.03 0.87 0.39 0.06
(b1+g1) Sudden stops
Lagged fixed assets 0.00 0.84 0.00 0.80 -0.05 0.01 -0.07 0.01
Lagged growth of fixed assets -0.47 0.00 -0.47 0.00 -0.45 0.00 -0.59 0.00
Lagged profitability 0.42 0.05 0.37 0.09 -0.17 0.49 -0.23 0.36
Lagged maturity structure -0.17 0.02 -0.16 0.03 -0.17 0.03 -0.20 0.03
















































Lagged growth of sectoral exports -0.07 0.23
Tradable sector dummy 0.12 0.02
Size (market value) 0.08 0.00 0.10 0.00
Ownership dummy 0.06 0.16 0.10 0.03
Multinational dummy -0.03 0.74 -0.01 0.95
ADR dummy -0.02 0.90 0.00 0.99
Constant C 0.12 0.66 0.10 0.72 -0.32 0.27 -0.22 0.52
No. of observations 1791 1648 1648 1113
R squared: within 0.16 0.17 0.25 0.30
          between 0.02 0.01 0.01 0.08
          overall 0.12 0.13 0.17 0.24
Table 4. (Continued) Regression results – Entire sample
(1)                                          (2)                                (3)                                  (4)
Coefficient p-value Coefficient p-value Coefficient p-value Coefficient p-value
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are largely determined by domestic consumption.
As for firm characteristics, size continues to be significant in all cases, but
there are some other variables that come into effect. For tradable sector firms,
having a high degree of Thai ownership helped to increase fixed assets growth by
0.1% during the Sudden Stop period. Meanwhile, for nontradable firms, being
multinational reduces the growth of fixed assets during tranquil times. That is to
say that the significant effect with the multinational variable previously found in
Table 4, column (3), was due to the nontradable sector firms.
C. Debt structure, long- vs. short-term maturity
Since having a longer debt maturity structure seems to be beneficial at times of
economic fragility, we explore this relationship further. We divide the sample between
those firms that have a longer-term maturity structure of debt and those that have
a shorter one, to analyze how they are affected by certain sector- and firm-specific
characteristics during tranquil and tumultuous episodes.18
We adjust the benchmark model as follows:
Iijt /Kijt-1 = b1(C+X) + g1 SS (C+X) + h1 LongMaturity (C+X)                                         (4)
                + l1 LongMaturity SS (C+X) + zijt
In this case, the b1 coefficient captures the average response of sector- and
firm-specific characteristics on the fixed assets of firms holding debt with a short-
term maturity structure during tranquil times, while (b1+g1) captures their average
response during the sudden stop episode. Alternatively, (b1+h1) captures the
average response of sector and firm characteristics on fixed assets of firms holding
debt with a long-term maturity structure during good times, while (b1+g1+h1+l1)
captures their average response during the sudden stop episode (see Table 6).
Firms that have a longer-term debt maturity structure should be less financially
constrained than those holding debt with short-term maturity. Consequently, in
general terms they should be less likely to rely on constrained physical capital
adjustment to fulfill debt obligations because they have more time to look for
alternative ways of finding either financing or other means to repay debt.
There are certain firm-specific characteristics that influence decisions regarding
18 The sample is divided based on a median value of a ratio, short-term borrowing over total
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Table 5. Regression results – Tradable vs. nontradable sectors
Coefficient p-value Coefficient p-value
(b1) Tradable producers (b1+h1) Nontradable producers
Lagged fixed assets -0.11 0.00 -0.08 0.00
Lagged growth of fixed assets 0.00 1.00 -0.13 0.00
Lagged profitability 0.26 0.05 0.60 0.00
Lagged maturity structure -0.01 0.90 -0.06 0.41
Lagged growth of
sectoral consumption 0.31 0.01 1.78 0.00
Size (market value) 0.08 0.00 0.12 0.00
Ownership dummy 0.02 0.57 0.00 0.98
Multinational dummy 0.00 0.95 -0.27 0.00
ADR dummy 0.04 0.63 -0.17 0.72
Constant C 0.40 0.08 -0.58 0.04
(b1+g1) Tradable producers (b1+g1+h1+l1) Nontradable
during sudden stops  producers during sudden stops
Lagged fixed assets -0.08 0.02 -0.04 0.94
Lagged growth of fixed assets -0.13 0.00 -0.72 0.00
Lagged profitability -0.25 0.38 0.09 0.80
Lagged maturity structure -0.20 0.05 -0.26 0.07
Lagged growth of
sectoral consumption 0.52 0.05 1.99 0.00
Size (market value) 0.10 0.00 0.15 0.00
Ownership dummy 0.11 0.02 0.09 0.22
Multinational dummy 0.01 0.94 -0.27 0.07
ADR dummy -0.11 0.42 -0.33 0.51
Constant C -0.27 0.48 -1.24 0.02
No. of observations 1648
R squared: within 0.27
     between 0.02
     overall 0.20 JOURNAL OF APPLIED ECONOMICS 328
these firms’ fixed asset growth. For example, firms holding mostly short-term debt
tend to focus primarily on firm size during both good and bad times to make
decisions regarding the fixed assets adjustment. Both during good and bad times,
being a large firm leads to positive fixed asset growth rates in spite of the shorter
debt maturity structure. Furthermore, during tranquil periods being a tradable
producer also works favorably, leading to fixed asset growth and consequently to
a lower likelihood of having to resort to the sale of fixed assets to fulfill financing
constraints.
Though still a significant factor, firm size matters less for firms holding long-
term debt—significant at 9% as opposed to 0% for short-term debt holders. During
tranquil times, with a less financially constrained macroeconomic environment in
general, our results demonstrate that for firms with long-term debt maturity
structures, additional factors such as being a multinational firm or an ADR issuer
matter in firms’ fixed assets adjustment. Having additional sources of financing,
such as through the issuance of ADRs, reduces the likelihood of having to resort
to adjustment of fixed assets, but this is so only in tranquil times. This is very
intuitive especially during good times. During crisis times, alternatively, fixed assets
adjustments of firms holding long-term debt depend solely on firm size.
D. Robustness tests
To assess the robustness of these findings, we conducted extensive sensitivity
analysis by incorporating some variables of interest. They are market-to-book
value, firm age, and the quadratic sector macroeconomic variable (consumption),
which will be discussed in this section.19 Reassuringly, however, this analysis
revealed that the significance of variables did not change given alternative
specifications. Table 7 presents the results.
We first test the significance of market-to-book value as this could be an
important factor affecting firms’ incentive to invest. Myers (1977) noted that high
market-to-book ratios indicate the presence of growth opportunities, which can be
thought of as real options. Hence, we can possibly expect a positive impact on the
19 Another important investment relationship is the one with “uncertainty”. Uncertainty as
measured by standard deviation of monthly growth in the equity price was also tested. Both
current and lagged values were incorporated. Results reiterate the importance of profitability in
tranquil time, and debt maturity structure during the sudden stop period, though slightly smaller
magnitude than that with the benchmark specification. We left the variable out of the benchmark
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Table 6. Regression results – Long- vs. short-term debt maturity structure
   Coefficient p-value Coefficient p-value
(b1) Short-maturity holders (b1+h1) Long-maturity holders
Lagged fixed assets -0.11 0.00 -0.07 0.00
Lagged growth of fixed assets -0.14 0.00 0.05 0.16
Lagged profitability 0.39 0.00 0.52 0.00
Lagged growth of sectoral
consumption 0.43 0.01 0.37 0.04
Tradable sector dummy 0.13 0.01 -0.17 0.09
Size (market value) 0.11 0.00 0.07 0.00
Ownership dummy 0.00 0.95 0.01 0.77
Multinational dummy -0.06 0.55 -0.11 0.10
ADR dummy -0.06 0.70 0.18 0.05
Constant C -0.04 0.89 0.03 0.88
(b1+g1)  Short-maturity (b1+g1+h1+l1) Long-maturity
holders during sudden stops holders during sudden stops
Lagged fixed assets -0.10 0.00 -0.06 0.13
Lagged growth of fixed assets 0.11 0.45 0.30 0.05
Lagged profitability -0.32 0.29 -0.20 0.59
Lagged growth of sectoral
consumption 0.14 0.67 0.09 0.84
Tradable sector dummy -0.04 0.37 -0.17 0.09
Size (market value) 0.10 0.00 0.07 0.09
Ownership dummy 0.09 0.13 0.10 0.22
Multinational dummy 0.00 0.97 -0.05 0.78
ADR dummy -0.08 0.72 0.16 0.59
Constant C 0.01 0.98 0.08 0.89
Number of observations 1666
R squared: within 0.28
     between 0.00
     overall 0.20 JOURNAL OF APPLIED ECONOMICS 330
balance sheet, and hence an increase in fixed assets growth. Meanwhile, past
empirical studies assert that the relationship is mostly negative (Booth et al. 2001)
due to agency costs attached to the real options as well as to short-run market
movements, and a lack of immediate reaction by corporations. Probably due to
these conflicting elements, we find the variable to be insignificant (Table 7, column
1), and exclude it from our benchmark specification.20
Further, firm age is an important factor in firms’ fixed assets adjustment.
Intuitively, younger firms may have more need to invest in fixed assets when they
set up their business, but then as firms age, the need for more fixed assets may
lessen. Estimation results (Table 7, column 2) support the prior that firm age and
fixed asset growth has a negative relationship, with one year of aging decelerating
firms’ fixed asset growth by 0.01% during tranquil times. Interestingly, this negative
relationship holds only during the tranquil period, and is an insignificant factor
during a sudden stop period. Although this is potentially an important variable,
we do not include it in the benchmark specification given the limited data availability.
Lastly, growth in consumption is replaced with a quadratic form in the benchmark
specification. This treatment is used to control for any nonlinear responses to the
recession that interaction terms (with Sudden Stop) may be picking up. Our main
conclusions are unaffected by this inclusion. Estimation results (Table 7, column
3) virtually remain the same, supporting the main results. Maturity structure
continues to show significant explanatory power during the sudden stop period.
The only distinction might be that the impact of quadratic consumption growth on
firms’ fixed asset growth is about half that of the benchmark specification, leaving
all other parameters the same.
20 Additionally, interest coverage ratio —as a factor affecting balance sheet— is also tested for
its explanatory power, but does not turn out to be a significant factor in our sample.331 ROLE OF DEBT MATURITY ON FIRMS’ FIXED ASSETS
Table 7. Robustness analysis
                                                              (1)                            (2)                             (3)
Coef. p-value Coef. p-value Coef. p-value
b1
Lagged fixed assets -0.05 0.00 -0.05 0.02 -0.04 0.00
Lagged growth of fixed assets -0.03 0.36 -0.04 0.53 -0.04 0.16
Lagged profitability 0.71 0.00 0.93 0.00 0.69 0.00
Lagged maturity structure -0.08 0.10 -0.27 0.00 -0.06 0.22
Lagged growth of sectoral
consumption (quadratic form) 0.25 0.00
Market-to-book value 0.00 0.19
Firm age -0.01 0.05
Constant C 0.78 0 0.95 0.00 0.60 0.00
(b1+g1)
Lagged fixed assets 0.00 0.84 -0.02 0.53 0.00 0.80
Lagged growth of fixed assets -0.47 0.00 -0.11 0.19 -0.47 0.00
Lagged profitability 0.42 0.06 0.22 0.68 0.37 0.09
Lagged maturity structure -0.17 0.02 -0.23 0.16 -0.16 0.03
Lagged growth of
sectoral consumption
(quadratic form) 0.17 0.15
Market-to-book value 0.00 0.98
Firm age 0.00 0.77
Constant C 0.12 0.657 0.48 0.44 0.10 0.72
Number of observations 1791 413 1648
R squared: within 0.16 0.11 0.17
    between 0.02 0.04 0.01
    overall 0.12 0.09 0.13
Variables JOURNAL OF APPLIED ECONOMICS 332
IV. Conclusion
We have explored the relationship between fluctuations in firms’ fixed assets growth
and financial constraints in the context of the capital inflow reversals and
devaluation of the late 1990s in Thailand. We looked at data from 284 nonfinancial
firms in tradable and nontradable industries listed in the Thai stock market between
1992 and 2001. Some of the most important patterns that emerged revealed that
Thai nonfinancial firms suffered from large declines in the growth of their fixed
assets of approximately 30% during the Sudden Stop episode. This finding
supported our initial belief that a large portion of the decline in firm fixed assets
could have been in the form of distressed sales.
Regression results enhanced broad trends, initially identified through graphical
analysis, by detailing what were the particular firm-specific factors that accentuate
fixed asset fluctuations. The main results are that shocks to net worth—profitability
and maturity structure—exhibit striking regularities in affecting fixed assets
adjustment. The rate of Thai firm’s fixed asset accumulation is reduced if firms
have more short-term debt or firms are less profitable. Interestingly, the two variables
appear important in different periods—profitability in the tranquil period but
maturity structure in the sudden stop period.
Additionally, there are firms’ characteristics that matter for fixed assets
adjustment. The size variable appears most important among the characteristics
by significantly affecting the fixed asset adjustment at all times—with smaller firms
having to reduce fixed assets. Being multinational or not affects nontradable firms,
while tradable firms’ decisions were affected by the degree of Thai ownership
during the sudden stop period. The economic significances of these are less so
than the size variable, however.
The results are intuitive and in line with the literature that describes situations
of financial constraints, the behavior of firms in distress, and, to some extent, the
characteristics of fire sales. Future research should aim at detailing forced investment
adjustments with price pressure to capture directly the phenomenon of fire sales
of fixed assets. Furthermore, our findings are testable in other regions or markets
that have undergone similar episodes and some have already been initiated.333 ROLE OF DEBT MATURITY ON FIRMS’ FIXED ASSETS
Table A1. Variable descriptions and sources
Variable                         Construction        Source
Investment Growth of total fixed assets, (Kijt -Kijt-1 )/Kijt-1 Datastream
Capital flow Current account (line 78ALD) + exceptional International
finance (line 79DAD) Financial Statistics,
IMF
ADRs Dummy variable denoting 1 if ADR is issued JP Morgan’s
by the Thai firm in question and zero otherwise. www.adr.com
Our dataset includes all ADRs outstanding as
quoted in the NYSE as of 9/2002




Sectoral exports Percentage change of variable in local currency Customs
Department, Bank of
Thailand
Profitability After-tax profit/total assets Datastream
Interest coverage Earnings before interest and taxes divided by net Datastream
ratio  interest charges (nm1300/nm2408)
Debt maturity Short-term debt divided by total debt Datastream
structure
Tradable vs. Dummy variable based on the sector Datastream
nontradable classification (tradable: food, household,
manufacturing, and primary, nontradable:
real estate and service)
Size Total market capitalization (=1 if greater Datastream
than median, =0 otherwise)
Market-to-book Stock price divided by book value per share Datastream
ratio
Firm age Number of years after establishment Firms’ websites
Ownership Percentage of Thai ownership (100% being Thailand’s
highest Thai ownership) Department of
Commerce
Multinational Dummy variable (1 if multinational, Financial Times
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Total fixed The net total (after deducting accumulated Datastream  (nm339)
assets depreciation) of land and  buildings, plant
and machinery, construction in progress and
other fixed assets. Assets leased out are excluded.
Total assets The sum of tangible fixed assets, intangible Datastream (nm392)
assets, investments (including associates), other
assets, total stocks & WIP, total debtors &
equivalent and cash & cash equivalents.
Total sales The amount of sales of goods and services to Datastream (nm104)
third parties relating to the normal industrial
activities of the company. It is net of
sales-related taxes and excludes any royalty
income, rental income and other operating income.
Total debt The total of all long- and short-term borrowings, Datastream (nm1301)
that is, the total of: Bank overdrafts and other
short term borrowings; Loan capital, including
debentures; Finance leases and hire purchase
agreements (short and long term); Obligations
under capital leases (short and long term);
Loans from associated companies; Notes
payable - finance companies.
Published The profit after tax for the financial period Datastream (nm623)
after-tax profit as reported by the company, before minority
interest, pre-acquisition profits, and provision
for preference and ordinary dividends. The
after-tax share of profits of associated
companies is included, where applicable.
Net interest The aggregate value of interest paid (after Datastream (nm2408)
charges capitalized interest) less interest received. It
includes interest on hire purchase and leasing.
Earnings before The earnings of a company before interest Datastream (nm1300)
interest and tax expense and income taxes. Calculated by taking
the pre-tax income and adding back only the
total interest expense on debt. Net interest
charges (total interest expense minus interest
income) is used for Thailand.
Table A1. (Continued) Variable descriptions and sources
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